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... the most important social values in the world are the things
that make no sense.
Thurman Arnold (1957).'
Like Jerome Frank, Thurman Arnold gained a large audience for his
psychological realism. Indeed, his two best-selling works, The
Symbols of Government (1935) and The Folklore of Capitalism
(1937),2 were the subject of prolonged and spirited public debate.
*Simon N. Verdun-Jones, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Simon Fraser University.
This article is part of a larger project being prepared for the degree of J.S.D. at Yale
Law School and will appear as a Chapter in a book dealing with the American
Legal Realist movement as a whole. The author wishes to express his thanks to
Professors McDougal and Reisman of Yale Law School for their critical comments
on this manuscript. For the purpose of analysis, the author uses a modified version
of the categories employed in the approach of Law, Science and Policy.
See H. D. Lasswell and M. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest (1942-43), 42 Yale L. J.
203.
M. McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-oriented Approach to Legal
Study (1956-57), 1 Natural Law Forum 53 and Jurisprudence in a Free Society
(1966-67), 1 Georgia L. Rev. 1.
H. D. Lasswell and M. McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy-oriented Perspective
(1966-67), 19 U. of Florida L. Rev. 486.
H. D. Lasswell, M. McDougal and W. Reisman, Theories about International
Lar: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence (1967-69), 8 Virginia J. of Int'l.
L. 188.
H. D. Lasswell and M. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory about Law (1971), 44 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 362 and Trends in Theories about Law: Comprehensiveness in
Conceptions of Constitutive Process (1972), 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1.
See also S. N. Verdun-Jones, The Jurisprudence of Karl Llewellyn (1974), 1
Dalhousie L.J. 441 and The Jurisprudence of Jerome N. Frank - A Study In
American Legal Realism (1974),7 SydneyL. Rev. 180.
1. Letter to Frank C. Waldrop, October 30, 1957: Selections from the Letters and
Legal Papers of Thurman Arnold (Washington: Merkle Press, 1961) at 51
[hereinafter Selections ].
2. The Symbols of Government (New York: Harbinger Books, 1962) [hereinafter
Jurisprudence Washed with Cynical Acid 471
Delighting in his special brand of corrosive satire, Thurman Arnold
employed the tools of psychology in a superbly witty-albeit
merciless--debunking of traditional Jurisprudence. Significantly,
Arnold was no mere academic commentator but an extraordinarily
enthusiastic participant in public life; in the course of his chequered
career he was Mayor of Laramie, Wyoming; Law Professor at Yale;
Government Trust-Buster par excellence; Federal Judge; and
formidable advocate (often in the service of causes that were
anything but popular in the threatening days of rampant
McCarthyism). 3 This gradually accumulating wealth of practical
experience united with great literary talents and broad intellectual
interests render Thurman Arnold one of the more formidable
scholars of his generation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Arnold's work owes much
to the close association he enjoyed with his Yale colleague, Edward
Stevens Robinson. It is impossible to assess the direction which
Robinson's work might have taken had he survived a tragic accident
but it is at least clear that his one major jurisprudential offering, Law
and the Lawyers (1935), contains much that Arnold was later to
build on with such eminent success. Since Arnold generously
acknowledged his debt to his former colleague, frequent reference
will be made to Robinson's work in the course of our analysis of
Arnold's Jurisprudence.
4
H. The Establishment of Observational Standpoint
Looked at from within, law is the center of an independent
universe with economics the center of a coordinate universe.
Symbols]; The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1962) [hereinafter Folklore].
3. See A. Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of Law (1969-70), 79 Yale L.J.
988, particularly at 993. Among the victims of anti-communist hysteria whom
Arnold's firm defended were Dorothy Bailey, Dr. John P. Peters, Owen Lattimore
and Dr. Edward Condon.
4. Arnold stated that the genesis of The Symbols of Government and The Folklore
of Capitalism lay in a course on the "psychological basis of the law" offered by
himself and Robinson at the Yale Law School. See Arnold, Fair Fights and Foul:
A Dissenting Lawyer's Life (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965) at 67-68.
For a discussion of the nature of realism at Yale, see W. L. Twining, Karl
Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) at
67-69. A brief survey of Robinson's jurisprudence may be found in H. G.
Reuschlein, Jurisprudence - Its American Prophets (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril
Co., 1951) at 307-27. Robinson's major work was Law and the Lawyers (New
York: Macmillian, 1935).
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Looked at from outside, we can begin to see what makes the
wheels go round and catch a vision of how we can exercise
control, not only of the physical environment, but also of the
mental and spiritual environment. When men begin to examine
philosophies and principles as they examine atoms and electrons,
the road to discovery of the means of social control is open. 5
Perhaps the influence of Robinson is most marked in the highly
distinctive observational standpoint recommended by Arnold in his
jurisprudential writings. When his colleague died in 1935, Arnold
published a short tribute in the Yale Law Journal in which he credits
Robinson with the development of an immensely important
intellectual tool:
Professor Robinson saw jurisprudence not from the point of view
of an umpire deciding which jurists were right, but from the point
of view of a psychologist studying a group which was undergoing
spiritual conflict between ideals and practical needs, both of
which had to be recognized .... He asserted that there was
room for two sciences, one a science of law to be used within the
little dramatic universe of the law and the other a science about
law which was useful not on the judicial stage but in the
conference room of the diagnostician of social institutions. 6
This distinction between a science of law and a science about law
lies at the very heart of Arnold's approach to law and legal
institutions. In his view, law must be regarded as a form of
symbolic thinking or as an attitude or way of thinking about human
institutions in terms of ideals rather than of observed facts.
In other words, Arnold viewed law as a species of folklore and he
urged social scientists to treat legal philosophies with the same
degree of objectivity as that which characterized the
anthropologist's approach towards the myths of primitive peoples.
Arnold's favorite personification of this standpoint is the ubiquitous
"man from Mars" who is completely free from any identification
with the value conflicts underlying the legal system which is the
object of his observation. 7 In this respect, it is evident that both
Arnold and Robinson, like the institutional economists before them,
profited greatly from the observational standpoint devised by the
cultural anthropologists 8: in particular, they owed a special debt to
5. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 163-64.
6. T. Arnold, The Jurisprudence of Edward S. Robinson (1936-37), 46 Yale L.J.
1282 at 1286.
7. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 31.
8. The functional movement has given great vitality to legal thinking and has
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Malinowski. 9
However, in order to develop the standpoint of what he liked to
call the "fact-minded" observer, Arnold followed Robinson's lead
and turned to the specific field of psychology. Beginning with the
premise that men are somehow constrained to personify social
institutions, Arnold suggests that the psychologist's point of view
towards such personifications may well provide the foundation for a
scientific study of social problems. In The Folklore of Capitalism,
he argues that the platform for a fact-minded observer should be the
following:
1. Institutions are like personalities playing a dramatic part in
society. They are to be judged by their utility in the
distribution of physical comforts and in the development of an
atmosphere of spiritual peace.
2. When institutions fail to function, reforms must be attempted
with something like the same point of view with which a
trained psychiatrist reforms an individual. That point of view
must recognize that an institution has something which may be
called a subconscious mind. This means only that its verbal
conduct must be calculated to inspire morale and not to
describe what it does.
3. Law and economics are the formal language of institutions on
parade. 10
Arnold believed that this point of view was one which, while it
recognizes the vital role that folklore plays in social organization,
does not mislead us as to its function in society. A priesthood of
some kind or another is an inevitable concomitant of social life and
its perspectives are a valid subject for serious study but these
raised law to the status of a social science .... Culture from the functional
standpoint is regarded not only as dynamic but as an organic whole. Modem
anthropology endeavours to study exogamy, totemism and other manifestations
of primitive culture not solely with regard to the narrow field which these phases
occupy but also in relation to the entire field of social organization. Primitive
culture is examined in action, and preconceived assumptions and paper schemes
are banished. To-day law and anthropology are in their programme one. (H.
Cairns, Law and The Social Sciences (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World
1935) at 10- 11.)
One anthropological work of crucial significance in this context was Ruth
Benedict's, Patterns of Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1959). Note
particularly c. 1.
9. See Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in a Savage Society (New
Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1926). See also his article, Social Anthropology
in Encyclopedia Britannica (14th ed., 1929).
10. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 137-38.
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perspectives must not be allowed to influence the "fact-minded"
observer's attempts to develop an understanding of the dynamics of
the social process. In brief, the "priesthood" expounds the science
of law or economics while the fact-minded observer develops a
science about these disciplines.
The specific question we must now ask, however, is whether
Arnold's clearly articulated observational standpoint is part of a
genuinely comprehensive scientific approach to law or whether it is
adopted as a mere "literary device" of some sort. Significantly, the
latter view was expressed by Max Lerner - a close contemporary
of Arnold's. Lerner contended that Arnold's standpoint was an
intellectual tool more appropriately fashioned for the social satirist
than for the genuine scientist."' However, a close examination of
Arnold's underlying conception of science should reveal that
Lerner's interpretation is in many respects seriously misleading.
III. Arnold's Conception of Science
Nowhere does Arnold undertake a detailed discussion of scientific
method. Unlike Karl Llewellyn, for example, he does not attempt to
explore the foundations for a methodology specifically suited to the
study of legal phenomena; 12 nor does he appear to have shown
much enthusiasm for the development of specific methods of social
research. Indeed, it is said that Arnold was outspokenly
contemptuous of the type of quantitative empirical study pioneered
by his colleagues, Clark and Shulman, at the Yale Law School. 13
However, the tacit conception of science underlying Arnold's
Jurisprudence is by no means impervious to investigation.
11 .The protestations of complete objectivity that we have been hearing from
students of society in the past quarter century take on a religious note: it is as if
they were washing themselves in the blood of the scientific lamb ... I suspect
that Arnold assumes his attitude of "detachment" mainly as a literary device.
For he must know that the realm of society cannot be chartered with the
inhuman precision that we apply to physics or astronomy .... It is as a prelude
to ... a scientific humanism that Arnold's book [Folklore] is chiefly valuable.
It belongs in the category of corrosive books, which eat away the past
complacencies, without the removal of which future constructs are impossible.
(M. Lerner, The Shadow World of Thurman Arnold (1938), 47 Yale L.J. 687 at
687-88.)
12. See S. N. Verdun-Jones, The Jurisprudence of Karl Llewellyn (1974), 1
Dalhousie L.J. 441 at 446-52.
13. See, e.g., C. Clark and H. Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases -A Study in
Judicial Administration (1934), 43 Yale L.J. 867. Arnold's opinion of such studies
was conveyed to the author by Professor Myres McDougal.
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Arnold's conception of science appears to have been moulded by
at least two distinct streams of American social thought; first by
institutional economics; and secondly by the brand of psychology
advocated by Edward Robinson.
1. The Influence of Institutional Economics
Walton Hale Hamilton (an economist on the Yale Law Faculty
and Arnold's friend for many years) was almost certainly the
channel through which Arnold became acquainted with a school of
economics that ranged far and wide in its intellectual breadth. The
school had its roots in the work of Thorstein Veblen whose Theory
of the Leisure Class14 is in many ways a spiritual ancestor of
Arnold's Folklore of Capitalism. The key to the institutional
economist's approach is that he examines the economic system as
part of human culture, which is itself conceived of as a complex of
many institutions. 15 This intellectual scheme clearly influenced all
Arnold's writings after 1935 and it is interesting to note that many
of the issues he raises are explicitly foreshadowed in Hamilton's
influential entry - "Institution": witness the following excerpts:
In the course of time the function of an institution may be
compromised by or perhaps even be lost in its establishment. The
spirit may become the letter, and the vision may be lost in a ritual
of conformity. In time a way of intellectual inquiry may become
a mere keeping of the faith; a nice propriety in social relations
may decay into a code of etiquette; or a morality intended to point
the way to the good life may come to impose the duty of doing
right. Thus ceremonial replaces purposive action and claims
vicarious obedience . . . so long as laissez faire dominated our
minds, dialectic served well enough to turn out explanatory
apologies for the existing social arrangements; when we began to
14. T. Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Modem Library, 1934).
For the possible influence of Veblen on New Deal philosophy, see C. W. Mills,
Sociology and Pragmatism (New York: Galaxy Books, 1966) at 466. For Veblen's
role in establishing the intellectual background to American Legal Realism, see M.
White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1957) at 21-27, 76-93.
15. For the influence of cultural anthropology on the institutional school, see A.
Gruchy, Economic Thought: The Institutional School in 4 International
Enclycopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press,
1968) at 463. See also Benedict, supra, note 8. The influence is readily discernible
in Veblen's work; note his approval of the following statement, "Anthropology is
destined to revolutionize the political and the social sciences as radically as
bacteriology has revolutionized the science of medicine": quoted in White, supra,
note 14 at 22.
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demand that order and direction be imposed upon an unruly
society, a genetic study of how its constituent usages had grown
into empirical organization seemed proper. An inquiry into
institutions may supply the analytical knowledge essential to a
program of social control or it may do no more than set
adventures for idle curiosity. In either event the study of
institutions rests itself upon an institution .. .16
In addition to his role in fashioning what became a basic unit of
analysis in Arnold's jurisprudence, it is clear that the particular
interest of Hamilton in the integration of the traditionally "separate
sciences" of law and economics had an equally fruitful impact upon
the formation of Arnold's own broad interdisciplinary approach. 17
Indeed, it is instructive to note that Arnold's description of his
colleague's work suggests that both scholars were attempting to
fulfill the same intellectual task-namely the task of "observing the
inter-actions of legal symbols and economic dogma with the
pressures of the industrial revolution of the twentieth century." 18
2. The Influence of the Psychology of Edward Robinson
A sincerely fact-minded jurisprudence would insist upon getting
behind the utterances of the judge to the psychological,
sociological, and economic details of the case at bar. And more
than that such a jurisprudence would insist upon examining the
opinion of the appellate judge, not as the outpouring of a logical
machine, but as the psychological processes of a fairly important
member of a complex institutional life. ' 9
As we can see from the above passage, Robinson himself was
influenced by the institutional approach but his particular
contribution to Arnold's intellectual development was the fashion-
ing of a distinctively psychological observational standpoint. In his
Yale Law Journal article reviewing Robinson's contribution to
Jurisprudence, Arnold portrays his colleague as "an observer
studying the effect of the psychological compulsions which form
institutions on the conduct of those institutions. ' 20 Robinson
16. W. H. Hamilton, Institution, in 8 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New
York: Macmillan, 1932) at 86. The influence of the institutional approach was a
crucial factor in the development of American legal realism in general. See e.g.,
Verdun-Jones, supra, note 12 at 447-49.
17. For the role of institutional economics in fostering an inter-disciplinary
approach to social problems, see Gruchy, supra, note 15 at 466.
18. Eulogy delivered on October 30, 1948; Selections, supra, note I at 45.
19. Robinson, supra, note 4 at 67-68.
20. Arnold, supra, note 6 at 1288.
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believed that, in this light, law and economics can only be viewed as
part of the folklore of the people and, according to Arnold, this
realization lead Robinson to lay his finger upon the reason for the
hitherto unsuccessful integration of law with the social sciences. In
Arnold's words:
He (Robinson) did not think that there were separate "legal
aspects" and "economic aspects" to a problem. He thought they
were only different attitudes which men took toward the same set
of events on different occasions.
21
As a consequence, Robinson argued that social scientists should
develop a unified approach towards the study of legal institutions;
this approach would be founded in the promise that the intellectual
bedrock of any meaningful science of social control must be the
discipline of psychology. After all, law (being concerned with the
regulation, mitigation, and composition of human conflict)
necessarily revolves around matters psychological.
Tragically, Robinson's "naturalistic jurisprudence" remained in
the realm of aspiration rather than tangible achievement. Robinson
failed to develop any conceptual framework capable of generating
testable hypotheses about law and social control; nor was he able to
develop a methodology capable of implementing his grandiose
scheme for a unified science of social control. At the root of these
failures is his apparent reluctance to indicate what specific
contribution psychology has to offer modem jurisprudence. 22 As a
consequence, Robinson proved to be incapable of harnessing
psychology to the service of a systematic science of human
behaviour; indeed, his reader is often left with the distinct impression
that psychology for Robinson is just another point of view
masquerading as a social science:
21. Id. at 1287.
22. See H. D. Lasswell, Book Review (1935), 44 Yale L.J. 388. Lasswell makes
three pungent criticisms of the approach adopted by Robinson:
(a) Naturalistic analysis will not of itself lead to the humanism presumably
favoured by Robinson: "A naturalistically equipped elite will not necessarily
use candor in talking to anybody but itself. A full and free confession of intent
to all the world is no necessary outcome of insight."
(b) Robinson fails to distinguish between psychologists and other social
scientists adopting a naturalistic approach thus failing to emphasize the relative
contribution which psychology has to offer.
(c) Robinson fails to underscore the "technical creativeness" of psychology by
his neglect of specific research methods already developed by the discipline.
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• . . the essential feature of psychology is a persistent intellectual
curiosity about the fundamental and general characteristics of
human nature .... 23
Fortunately, Arnold was able to establish a conceptual framework
which significantly improved upon Robinson's diffuse insights.
Arnold styled his approach "a science of political dynamics"; in the
Folklore of Capitalism, he states:
• . . I choose the term "Political Dynamics" to refer to a science
about society which treats its ideals, its literature, its principles of
religion, law, economics, political systems, creeds, and
mythologies as part of a single whole and not as separate
subjects, each with its own independent universe of principles.
The term is not original and is already becoming familiar. I select
it because it represents the easiest transition I can think of from
the term "political economy" which described an individualistic
era. We have reached a time when men are beginning to realize
their complete interdependence, when the personality of the
individual is submerged in the personality of the organization.
What I have in mind is a science of the diagnosis of maladjusted
organizations in an age where organizations have replaced
individuals as units. 
24
The conceptual framework which constitutes this "science of
political dynamics" is far from being a "mere literary device".
Arnold developed it in such a way that it is perfectly capable of
generating crucial hypotheses about law and social control; indeed,
Arnold managed to establish twenty-four such constructs within the
compass of The Folklore of Capitalism.25 Furthermore, these
hypotheses are eminently susceptible to empirical testing, as the
following example illustrates:
A conflict often arises between an ideal and a social need not
accepted as legitimate or moral. This creates a situation in which
an immoral and undercover organization will arise. The ideal will
be represented by a moral organisation which proves that the
social need is not a real need at all, but a form of sin. The need
will be represented by an immoral organization, which will be
accepted and tolerated as a necessary evil, in the same way that
the church accepted the existence of the devil.
26
Arnold discussed this particular hypothesis in relation to the
There is little doubt that Lasswell's analysis applies with equal force to Arnold's
own approach.
23. Robinson, Law and the Lawyers, supra, note 4 at 99.
24. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 349.
25. Id., c. XIV.
26. Id. at 365-66.
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enforcement of anti-trust laws, the growth of political machines,
and Prohibition. Interestingly enough, it has recently been
employed by Max Rheinstein in his analysis of the dualism of
traditional divorce laws. 27
However, while we may readily accept the proposition that
Arnold's conceptual framework is capable of spawning meaningful
hypotheses, we must also be careful to define the universe within
which such a framework has utility. Arnold is chiefly concerned
with the manner in which society-through the medium of various
institutions-organizes itself to meet its practical needs. More
specifically, he is concerned with the way in which such
institutional activity is legitimated by means of symbols and creeds.
The central thesis in his work is that, in an age of great social and
technological change, these symbols and creeds may well come to
impede the satisfaction of our ever developing practical needs; such
a situation arises, for example, when new demands upon institutions
can not be legitimated in terms of the prevailing political doctrines
or when such demands encroach upon habits firmly entrenched by
the long march of time. In brief, Arnold is almost exclusively
concerned with the inter-action of symbols and dogma with the
processes of social change. Thus his conceptual scheme is in fact
confined to a much more limited range of phenomena than the term
"political dynamics" suggests. Confined to this limited area
Arnold's conceptual framework is reasonably adequate for its task
but it is seriously deficient if it is to be the basis for a comprehensive
study of politics.
In this respect, one of Arnold's fundamental assumptions is
curiously ill advised. This assumption is the belief that institutional
behaviour can be analyzed in exactly the same manner as that of
individuals. Clearly such an approach can only be maintained for
very limited purposes indeed. It must have been evident to Arnold
27. Below the surface of an official law of high-minded moral purposes hides the
"snake" of nonenforcement. Of this phenomenon, common to many parts of the
world and rampant in the United States, but one example is consent divorce
hidden under the facade of divorce as punishment of misconduct or as an escape
hatch open solely in cases of complete and irremediable marriage breakdown.
The institution had to be developed as the inevitable compromise between
conservatives able to keep statute makers in fear and liberal pursuers of
individual happiness. Like other kinds of sub rosa institutions, that of unofficial
consent divorce cannot grow in the publicity of the legislature. (M. Rheinstein,
Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1972)
at 257-58.)
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that such an approach studiously ignores the fact that institutional
behaviour is bound to differ from that of individuals in those
situations where the crucial factor is the interaction of individual
with individual or of institution with institution.
A further difficulty is Arnold's complete failure to conceptualize
power phenomena - a task which is clearly vital to the
development of a comprehensive science of political dynamics.
Indeed, although he makes frequent reference to "political
machines" and "big corporations", Arnold never attempts to
undertake any systematic examination of the bases of their power.
Similarly, Arnold does not grapple with the problem of identifying
the basic components of social and technological change even
though his central concern is with the interaction of such change
with institutional symbols and dogma. Instead of examining the
actual processes of change, Arnold refers only to the "practical
needs" which such change engenders.
We may therefore conclude that Arnold's conceptual scheme can
only be applied to a limited area of the political process. In this
respect, it is clear that Arnold's claim that he had laid the foundation
for a science of political dynamics was somewhat premature. While
the psychological analysis of institutions is a valuable study in itself
it hardly amounts to the "key to the integration of law with the
social sciences." Of course, political science was itself at a stage of
relative infancy during the period which saw the genesis of Arnold's
basic ideas 28; hence it remained for subsequent generations to
28. The point to be made is that Arnold over-stated the degree to which his
"principles of political dynamics" could answer crucial questions about the
political process as a whole. As with many scholars of the so-called realist
movement, Arnold identified vital questions about law and the political process but
found himself unable to tap any source of mature scholarship which was capable of
furnishing adequate answers to such questions. At the time when Arnold's thought
was in the process of formulation, political science was still in a stage of relative
infancy and was only just beginning to develop meaningful theories about the
political process. In discussing the growth of political science in America, Sorauf
has argued:
On the eve of World War II ... American political science was something of a
special case in the social sciences. It had no central organizing set of concepts or
body of theory, as did the discipline of economics. It shared little of the interest
of anthropology, sociology, and psychology for understanding the individual,
his socialization, his motivation, and his behaviour ........ It was a
heterogeneous, plural, and diverse discipline with little agreement about its
central concerns, its methods, and its basic goals. It was a discipline
uncomfortable in building theoretical propositions and perfecting
methodologies. Above all, it was a discipline without a clear intellectual
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incorporate Arnold's contribution into a systematic and comprehen-
sive science of political dynamics.29
Although Arnold's psychological point of view obviously
amounts to much more than a "mere literary device" it is fair to
point out that it is not accompanied by any form of adequate
methodology. Arnold evidently believed that he could study
institutional symbols and dogma solely by examining the official
utterances of the various institutions' spokesmen as reported in
newspapers and other publications. However, it is difficult to
envisage how such a method can be adequate for the task of testing
the various hypotheses suggested by Arnold's analysis. Further-
more, it is rather unfortunate that Arnold's work is almost
exclusively based upon an examination of a relatively short period
in American social history for it may well be that many of his
hypotheses would have to be modified in the face of data from other
historical periods or from other countries and cultures. Finally, it
may be noted that Arnold's inability to develop specific methods of
empirical research caused him to ignore an important area of
interest. By concentrating upon the official statements of dogma and
ignoring the actual perspectives of the various members of any
given institution, Arnold fails to document the competing symbols
existing at different levels of institutional life; the fact that different
members of an institution may defer to differing symbols and
dogma within the same body is of crucial importance to any
comprehensive study of the process of legitimation. 
30
identity. (Perspectives on Political Science (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Books,
1965) at 13-14.)
Perhaps Sorauf is more than a little cavalier in his dismissal of such prestigious
forebears as Arthur Bentley and the Chicago School centered around Charles
Merriam and Harold Lasswell. However, the Chicago School wal largely
contemporaneous with Arnold's development and, taking into account the
inevitable lag between formulation and permeation of ideas, our general point
remains valid. See A. F. Bentley, The Process of Government; A Study of Social
Pressures (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1908); C. E. Merriam, New Aspects of
Politics (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1925) and Political Power; Its Com-
position and Incidence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934); H. D. Lasswell, Politics:
Who Gets What, When, How (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1936).
29. For a basic framework mapping the social process, see H. D. Lasswell and A.
Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. P., 1950). For a
sociologist's view of the manner in which power phenomena may be
conceptualized, see A. L. Stirchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1968) c. 4.
30. See, for example, the position of professional specialists within a large
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IV. The Delimitation of a Focus of Inquiry
... [A]shift of emphasis [is needed] from the study of legal
doctrine to a study of the operation of an institution ... [l]t is not
easy for the lawyer to make the court the center of his study and
to consider the doctrine of substantive law only as factors in
preserving its power and independence, in determining its
attitude, and in furnishing it with a method of expression. 31
(emphasis added)
Although Arnold's work surveys the whole gamut of institutional
life, there is no doubt that the main focus of inquiry is squarely upon
the judicial decision. In Arnold's view, our "spiritual government"
centres on the judicial system and he argues that around this hub
revolve all our popular ideals of government. On this basis, the
reason why Arnold does not devote more attention to the process of
administrative decision-making is to be found in his belief that
"bureaucracy" is not endowed with the same symbolic importance
as are the courts. Indeed, in his view, "bureaucracy" is itself a
negative symbol conjuring up visions of rampant red tape and
raising the spectre of the ancient American anathema -
government by men as opposed to government by abstract
principles of law. 32 Since Arnold's overriding concern was with the
symbols and dogma, it is hardly surprising that he should gravitate
to the judicial decision as the centre of his inquiry.
V. The Balance of Emphasis on Operations and Perspectives
It is part of the function of "law" to give recognition to ideals
representing the exact opposite of established conduct. Most of
its complications arise from the necessity of pretending to do one
thing, while actually doing another. It develops the structure of
an elaborate dream world where logic creates justice. It permits
us to look at the drab cruelties of business practices through
rose-colored spectacles. 33
Thurman Arnold's distinctive contribution to modern Jurisprudence
surely lies in his highly innovative treatment of perspectives; in this
respect, his efforts were not too far removed from those of Jerome
organization: R. Presthus, The Organizational Society (New York: Vintage Books,
1962) c. 8.
31. Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process
(1932), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 617 at 619.
32. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 200-209.
33. Id. at 34.
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Frank.34 While Arnold joins the mainstream of legal realism in
demonstrating that legal principles are not controlling in the process
of decision he also emphasizes his belief that this demonstration is
but the beginning of responsible academic inquiry. Indeed, Arnold
sternly rebuked many of his realist colleagues for their single-
minded pursuit of the all-too-evident disparity between "law in
action" and "law in the books"; in his view, such misplaced
concentration on the blatantly obvious obscures the most important
function of legal rules and principles .35
According to Arnold, the function of law is not so much to guide
society as to comfort it. For him, the greatness of law lies in the fact
that it preserves the appearance of unity while tolerating and
enforcing ideals which run in all sorts of opposing directions. In his
own words:
"Law" is primarily a great reservoir of emotionally important
symbols. It develops, as language develops, in spite of, and not
because of, the grammarians. Though the notion of a "rule of
Law" may be the moral background of revolt, it ordinarily
operates to induce acceptance of things as they are. It does this by
creating a realm somewhere within the mystical haze beyond the
courts, where all our dreams of justice in an unjust world come
true ....
From a practical point of view it (Law) is the greatest
instrument of social stability because it recognizes every one of
the yearnings of the underprivileged, and gives them a forum in
which those yearnings can achieve official approval without
involving any particular action which might joggle the existing
pyramid of power. It permits the use of an argumentative
technique by which powerful institutions can be defended on the
ground that taking away privileges from them would take away
freedom from the poor.
36
34. See S. N. Verdun-Jones, The Jurisprudence of Jerome N. Frank -A Study in
American Legal Realism (1974), 7 Sydney Law Review 180 at 191-96.
35. It is child's play for the realist to show that law is not what it pretends to be and
that its theories are sonorous, rather than sound; that its definitions run in
circles; that applied by skilful attorneys in the forum of the courts it can only be
an argumentative technique; that it constantly seeks escape from reality through
alternate reliance on ceremony and verbal confusion. Yet the legal realist falls
into grave error when he believes this to be a defect in the law. From any
objective point of view the escape of the law from reality constitutes not its
weakness but its greatest strength. Legal institutions must constantly reconcile
ideological conflicts, just as individuals reconcile them by shoving inconsisten-
cies back into a sort of institutional subconscious mind. (Symbols, supra, note 2
at 44.)
36. Id. at 34-36.
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The novelty of this approach no doubt springs from Arnold's
belief that man is basically an irrational beast, whose strong
subconscious impulses effectively preclude him from exercising a
free and deliberate choice between good and evil. However, Arnold
argues that man is extremely unwilling to recognize the fundamental
reality of his psychological predispositions because he has a
compelling-albeit futile-desire to live in a perfectly rational and
moral universe. In a vain attempt to satisfy this unattainable desire,
man is perforce driven to erect elaborate systems of rationalization
such as "Law" and "economics". These systems may be described
as man's ideals or folklore. Now because there is no correspondence
between the ideals he projects and the actual practices that exist in
the real world social man is forced to create legal rituals and popular
symbols which effectively render him unaware of the discrepancy
between illusion and reality-thus facilitating his adjustment to an
imperfect world. In Arnold's own words, man interposes "little
pictures" between himself and the real world in order to console
himself and to maintain the vitality of his institutions. Hence his
view that Law's function is not so much to guide society as to
comfort it.
No doubt this approach towards the study of perspectives owes
much to Robinson's wry observation that judicial opinions should
be examined in exactly the same manner as an anthropologist would
examine the ceremonial utterances of the high priesthood in a
primitive community. In any event, it is clear that Arnold missed no
opportunity to ridicule those foolish men who wholeheartedly
believed in the absolute reality of their myth-worlds. For example,
Arnold's view of that venerable body - the American Law Institute
- was that it "was ceremony of the very purest sort, dedicated to
the ideal that this was a government of law and not of men." 37 Of
Jurisprudence he bitingly said:
We may describe jurisprudence or the science of law in our
present day as the effort to construct a logical heaven behind the
courts, wherein contradictory ideals are made to seem consistent.
Naturally the contradictions are reconciled in the only way
logical contradictions can ever be reconciled, by giving each a
separate sphere to work in and pushing the inconsistencies back
into the obscurity of great piles of books which are taken on faith
and seldom read. . ..
We may finally define jurisprudence as the shining but
37. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 78.
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unfulfilled dream of a world governed by reason. For some it lies
buried in a system, the details of which they do not know. For
some, familiar with the details of the system, it lies in the depth
of an unread literature. For others, familiar with this literature, it
lies in the hope of a future enlightenment. For all, it is just around
the comer.
38
However, despite his excessivepenchant for literary humour, it is
nevertheless clear that Arnold's approach to the study of
perspectives greatly enriched modem Jurisprudence. In particular,
his distinctive contribution lies in his articulate emphasis upon
symbolism as the mediator between illusion and reality in social and
political life. By adopting this fertile approach, Arnold's work
emphatically underscores the crucial significance of symbolism in
the process of authoritative decision-making. Among many other
valuable insights, his treatment of symbolism led to a recognition of
the distinctive role of the lawyer as a manipulator of symbols - as
an active interventionist in the policy-making process.
However, while it is appropriate to praise the manner in which
Arnold gave new direction to legal scholarship it is also necessary to
recognize that his approach was often surprisingly shallow. In the
words of a contemporary critic:
... Arnold fails to differentiate between the levels of
symbolism. There are symbols that are merely abbreviations,
without which life would grow too complex for survival ...
There are [also] symbols by which some men achieve and
maintain a hold over the rest of mankind. There are finally, as
Arnold might have learned from Whitehead, whole symbol-
clusters that are evocative ways of thought and patterns of life.
Man as we find him is irrational enough; but Arnold adds to this
irrationality by attributing the distorting effects of symbolism
even to the situations where symbols alone give life meaning and
where they clear the path for, instead of blocking, social
construction. He lumps all the symbolism of men's actions
together, without getting at the purposes of those actions, without
getting at the for whats? An irrational symbol for one purpose
may be a perfectly rational symbol for another. It is Arnold's
38. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 56-59. See also Apologia for Jurisprudence (1935),
44 Yale L.J. 729 at 729. Here, the function of Jurisprudence is explained:
Functionally the primary purpose of the science of law is to be a sounding board
of both the prevalent hopes and the prevalent worries of those who believe in a
government of law and not of men, to -reconcile these hopes and worries
somewhere in the mists of scholarship and learning, and never to admit that this
is what it is doing.
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capacity to say for what? to his symbols that is at the root of much
of the book's confusion. When you see everything as
undifferentiated symbols, then the symbol ceases to have
meaning but takes its place only as a senseless particle in a mad
dance. ..39
Arnold's frequently shallow treatment of symbolism is unfortu-
nately complemented by a surprisingly sketchy approach towards
the study of operations. Arnold frequently refers to his belief that
"practical men" do not avail themselves of the teachings of law and
economics but he fails to tell us anything about the decisions
actually made by such "practical men", nor does he tell us much
about the institutional framework which surrounds such decision-
making activity. Similarly, while he is fond of treating law and
economics as a play in which it is vital that the machinery behind
the scenes remain concealed from the audience, 40 Arnold is
nevertheless most reluctant to describe that machinery - at least in
39. Lerner, supra, note 11 at 696-97.
For a strong criticism of Arnold's failure to differentiate between symbols and the
values they represent, see G. Gurvitch, The Sociology of Law (New York:
Philosophical Library and Alliance Book Corporation, 1942) at 186-87:
• . . Arnold, having grasped with particular force the decisive importance of
symbols in social and especially in jural reality, has been prevented from
reaching acceptable conclusions because of deficiency in the conception of
symbols themselves. Emphasizing rightly that social symbols are heavily
charged with emotion and even with mysticism, he feels justified in concluding
that they are entirely subjective projections, fantasies, meaningless illusions.
This conclusion has been reinforced in him by an intellectualist prejudice,
according to which all that is not subjective is necessarily rational. As though
emotional-volitional values, inspiring symbols, could not be considered
objective and spiritual, no less than logical ideas! .... The result has been
skepticism. . . . Hence his negation of all possibility of differentiating symbols
S... Thus Arnold finally cannot find a specific place... for law among social
symbols.
Once again however, we should point out that Arnold had no source of mature
scholarship to guide him in his approach to symbolism. Merriam, supra, note 28,
was only just beginning to develop a systematic analysis of symbolism in the
political process while Arnold himself was grappling with the problem
independently. Furthermore, at this time, the Father of Symbolic Interactionism -
George Herbert Mead - was only just beginning to scratch the surface of the
implications of symbolism for social psychology. Play, The Game, And the
Generalized Other appeared only in 1934. Coupled with the fact that Merriam,
Mead and Lasswell were at Chicago, it is easy to see that Arnold was forced to
develop his ideas in relative isolation.
For a more modem differentiation of symbolism, see H. D. Lasswell and A.
Kaplan,supra, note 29 at 10-13, 103-105, 136.
40. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 357.
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any terms more detailed than such vague phrases as "sub-rosa
political machines."
VI. Conception ofAuthority and Control
In a post-war evaluation of Jerome Frank's jurisprudence, Arnold
chided his realist colleagues for their failure to grasp the importance
of "authoritarian law based on human reasoning and respected with
mystical faith."41 In stark contrast, Arnold's own concern with the
fluctuating response of legal symbols to the challenge of social
change led him to pay close attention to the process by which
organizations legitimate their activities in terms of the prevailing
social ideals of the day; in this respect, he clearly contributed much
to our understanding of the authoritative element in law. Similarly,
Arnold's focus upon the increasing lag between institutional creeds
and the realities of social change ensured that he sufficiently
emphasized the element of control.
Arnold's treatment of authority is among the most revealing in
the literature of modern Jurisprudence. In his view, authority
adheres to institutional decision-making when the latter is
legitimated in terms of the prevailing myths and folklore of the day.
In a developed society such myths and folklore are generally
represented by a Constitution:
Because words and ceremonies are our only methods of
communication, everywhere we find that the creed is regarded as
the cornerstone of social institutions. "In the beginning was the
Word" is an idea which has been repeated over and over
wherever language is used. In this way of thinking we are as
primitive as the people of the Old Testament.
Therefore, the folklore of every people runs in something like
this form. A long time ago, with the aid of some sacred and
infallible force, certain exceptionally gifted forebears formulated
a lot of principles which contained the fundamentals of social
organization. Nations which, like the United States, trace their
beginnings to some single event think that their principles were
discovered all at one time. This circumstance gives them a
written constitution. ...
In this country we like to think that we decided to write down
all our governmental principles in one document called the
Constitution. Acutally, the Constitution consists of thousands of
documents written at various times. 
42
41. Id. at 26-27.
42. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 26-27. See also, Arnold, Judge Jerome Frank
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Since it represents current myths and folklore rather than rules,
the language of the Constitution is largely immaterial. "Out of it are
spun the contradictory ideals of governmental morality." Indeed the
very "elasticity" of constitutional language ensures that it can be
used on both sides of any popular issue without the person using it
having to be bothered with what the Constitution actually says:
It is essential to constitutionalism as a vital creed that it be
capable of being used in this way on both sides of any question,
because it must be the creed of all groups in order to function as a
unifying symbol. This way of thinking is essential to all
governmental organizations. It is the method by which the
organization can take pride in the superiority of its traditions.
Pride in his early struggles and a clinging to traditions which have
been handed to him by better men than he are deep-seated within
the psychology of the individual.
43
Now the Supreme Court's position as ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution establishes it as the foremost symbol of authority in
American society; indeed, it is placed at the very heart of the
process by which decisions are legitimated in terms of the prevailing
folklore and myths. According to Arnold, man's faith in a higher
law makes the Supreme Court the greatest unifying symbol in
American government. For the majority of the populace it is "the
concrete dramatization of the ideal that there is a power which
prevents government action which is arbitrary, capricious, and
based on prejudice." 
44
Particularly fascinating is Arnold's discussion of the manner in
which the Court's authority may be gravely threatened by a
combination of rapid technological change and an inherent judicial
reluctance to sanction the pressing needs generated by such change.
In Arnold's view, the authority of the Court is maintained by its
unique ability to reconcile opposing ideals in terms of "fundamental
principles" which transcend the petty squabbles of our everyday
existence. However, it is imperative that the philosophy of the court
be positive if it is to retain the adulation of the public. If the Court
allows its interpretation of the Constitution to become a judicial
hairshirt constantly blocking practical decisions in the name of
constitutional purity then its inopportune negativism will inevitably
strip the court of its prestige. In Arnold's view, precisely such a
(1957), 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633 at 634 and Verdun-Jones, supra, note 34 at 196-98.
43. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 29.
44. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 196.
Jurisprudence Washed with Cynical Acid 489
situation pertained in the mid-30s when the Court's alleged
conservatism precipitated a national crisis.
The manner in which the Court's authority was restored is
perhaps best told in Arnold's own words:
In this situation it was inevitable that the purely negative
philosophy of the majority finally became untenable. There were
only two possible outcomes to the proposal of the President.
Either the Court would change or there would be a new court.
Observers generally credit Mr. Chief Justice Hughes with the
political skill which accomplished the change. It is represented in
two opinions, one sustaining the minimum-wage law for women
and the other permitting the Wagner Labor Relations Act to be
applied to the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company.
These opinions represent a transition from a negative to a
positive philosophy of federal power. They are technical and
uninspired. However, they did clear away the underbrush. They
showed that the Court was capable of change.
Finally, there appeared Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in the
social-security case. Here was a note of hope and positive
affirmation ....
Here we have on a small scale, a way in which new social
philosophies appear. There is first the battle, with the fighting
speeches on both sides. Then there is the reconciliation with the
past. And finally there is the inspirational synthesis of a new
point of view. The social-security decision did much to restore
the prestige of the Court because of its note of positive
affirmation. Without it the writer has little doubt that Roosevelt's
Court plan would have been quickly passed.
45
However, while Arnold devotes considerable attention to the
Supreme Court as the paramount symbol of authority in American
government, he also underscores the fact that his approach towards
the study of authority is not confined solely to the upper echelons of
the constitutional hierarchy. Indeed, his treatment of the concept of
authority is clearly applicable to any social institution which has
developed any kind of established philosophy or creed - whether
the institution be a court, a governmental organization, or a private
business association.
Arnold's implicit recognition of the need to maintain a clear
working conception of authority and control perhaps emerges most
45. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 339-40.
SeeHelvering v.Davis (1936), 301 U.S. 619.
See generally, R. H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (New York:
Vintage Books, 1941) at 221-35.
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conspicuously in his witty chronicle of the American scene in the
era of the New Deal. In Arnold's view, the rugged individualism
which permeated American folklore in the early twentieth century
forcefully militated against the unwelcome recognition that
effective power often lay not in the authoritative hands of Congress
or the President but in the grasping hands of monolithic private
corporations or in the illegitimate hands of unmentionable sub rosa
political machines. The inability of legal folklore to adapt from a
world of private property to a world of vast corporate wealth meant
that government was frequently forbidden by constitutional taboo
from regulating the excesses of industrial giants. Similarly, the
prevailing legal ideology restricted the capacity of government to
cope with ever-increasing social needs because the prevailing
folklore cast the government in the r6le of a predator on private
property. According to Arnold, therefore, the prevailing symbols
and dogma of that unfortunate era prevented the established
authoritative decision-makers from coping with the demands of a
new world; instead, private enterprise exercised effective and
unrestrained control over a wide sector of public life while pressing
social needs were met by political machines which were denied the
stamp of authority. In Arnold's eloquent words:
... [W]e developed two coordinate governing classes: the one,
called "business", building cities, manufacturing and distribut-
ing goods, and holding complete and autocratic control over the
lives of millions; the other, called "government", concerned
with the preaching and exemplification of spiritual ideals, so
caught in a mass of theory that when it wished to move in a
practical world it had to do so by means of a sub rosa political
machine. There was no question as to where the temporal power
lay. Occasionally, the spiritual government could make a
business baron come on his knees to Washington, but these were
rare occurrences. It was the general opinion in America before
the depression that the government at Washington should render
unto Caesar the things which were Caesar's, and confine its own
activities to preaching. The attitude of the conservatives toward
government in business was the same as toward a minister of the
church who deserted his pulpit to buy a seat on the stock
exchange.4
6
As we shall see, Arnold believed that greater control would only
be restored to the nation's authoritative decision-makers in the event
of a new folklore emerging within American Society: such a
46. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 110.
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folklore was to be born out of Roosevelt's struggle for the New
Deal.4
7
VII. The Relationship between Law and the Social Process
The judicial trial thus becomes a series of object lessons and
examples. It is the way in which society is trained in right ways
of thought and action, not by compulsion, but by parables which
it interprets and follows voluntarily. Yet there are two distinct
kinds of object lessons - civil and criminal, the difference
between them is hard to define, but easy for the man on the street
to feel. For the businessman who needs a feeling of security from
the encroachments of those who are appointed to enforce the law,
the civil trial is most important. It exists to give the man of affairs
a sense of security in his commercial relationships both from
attack by his fellows and intermeddling of the government.
However, it is too complicated in its rituals and terminology to
appeal to the great mass of people who need to believe in the law.
For most persons, the criminal trial overshadows all other
ceremonies as a dramatization of the values of our spiritual
government, representing the dignity of the State as an enforcer
of law, and at the same time the dignity of the individual when he
is an avowed opponent of the State, a dissenter, a radical, or even
a criminal. 47
As we have already seen, Arnold was not concerned with
developing a comprehensive framework for the study of law in
society; instead he was concerned almost exclusively with a much
more limited inquiry into the nature of the interaction between legal
symbols and social change. Furthermore, we have argued that
Arnold's failure to conceptualize power phenomena coupled with
47. Arnold believed that a competent governing class could gain both power and
legitimacy only if the profession of politics was upgraded. In his view, politicians
were regarded with suspicion because in order to govern effectively they were
frequently forced to violate "fundamental principles" of law and economics. In the
1930s, the result was the political machine. In this respect, note Lerner's biting
comment:
.. . Arnold is throughout [The Folklore of Capitalism] betraying his scheme of
valuation. He depicts thinkers as stumbling along ineffectually while the
decisions of the world are left to men of little logic and ruthless purpose. The
intellectual, in the book, is always flouted in favor of the hard-boiled practical
politician and the organizing genius. Arnold displays a faith in the latter almost
akin to the sentiment the eighteenth century felt for the Noble Savage. And as a
corollary to the esteem he feels for the big doers, and the leaning toward the
great-man conception of the historic process, there is a tendency towards
anti-massism in the book. (Lerner, supra, note 11 at 697.)
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his seeming inability to identify the basic components of social and
technological change often caused even this very limited inquiry to
become a highly unsatisfactory undertaking. However, it is
important to recognize that while his work frequently suffers from
the conspicuous absence of a sufficiently systematic approach
Arnold was nevertheless able to develop some fascinating and
highly original insights into the relationship between law and the
social process.
Arnold's positive contribution in this area surely lies in his lucid
exposition of the notion that law may have a purely symbolic
function over and above any instrumental function it may perform.
Naturally, in an age when instrumentalism was the dominant
philosophy in American society, Arnold's approach assumed a vital
position in the construction of modem Jurisprudence. Perhaps the
most highly documented facet of Arnold's thesis is his discussion of
the symbolic importance of the anti-trust laws.
4 8
In Arnold's view, the unique position of the anti-trust laws can
really be understood only if they are viewed against the backcloth of
a total legal culture. The folklore prevailing in the period spanning
the gap between the adoption of the Sherman Act and the era of the
New Deal may clearly be characterized by its emphasis upon laissez
faire and rugged individualism. Naturally enough, within the
confines of such a folklore, there was little room for the idea of
governmental regulation of business; indeed to most Americans the
idea was contrary to their most fundamental principles. Furthermore
the underlying conception of a completely free and open market
composed of rugged individuals so permeated American legal
culture that the quasi-governmental functions performed by the
largest corporations were completely ignored; instead the "thinking
man" - to use Arnold's terminology - "personified" the
corporations and treated them exactly as though they were
"individuals" naturally participating in the great free market.
However, the rapidly increasing concentration of corporate wealth
and the notorious rapacity of so-called "Railroad Kings" and
"Robber Barons" forced the Congress to act. Faced, on the one
hand, by a dogma that idolized the concept of a free market
consisting of "rugged individuals" and, on the other, by the social
48. See generally, Folklore, supra, note 2, c. LX, passim; Arnold, Fair Fights
and Foul, supra, note 4, c. 14, "The Sherman Act as a Charter of Economic
Freedom".
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need for the services rendered by the large business organizations,
the legislation which ensued was a natural compromise. Indeed, in
Arnold's view, the Sherman Act was a compromise which
effectively reconciled the ideal of individual competition with the
practical necessity for corporate enterprise by symbolically
re-asserting the ideal in the form of extremely vague legislation
while simultaneously permitting concentration of corporate wealth
to continue largely unabated through lack of vigorous enforcement
policies.4 9 Arnold's discussion of the symbolic effect of the
anti-trust laws may be summarized by his approach in The Folklore
of Capitalism:
In order to reconcile the ideal with the practical necessity, it
became necessary to develop a procedure which constantly
attacked bigness on rational legal and economic grounds, and at
the same time never really interfered with combinations. Such
pressures gave rise to the antitrust laws which appeared to be a
complete prohibition of large combinations. The same pressures
made the enforcement of the antitrust laws a pure ritual. The
effect of this statement of the ideal and its lack of actual
enforcement was to convince reformers either that large
combinations did not actually exist, or else that if they did exist,
they were about to be done away with just as soon as
right-thinking men were elected to office. Trust-busting therefore
became one of the great moral issues of the day, while at the
same time great combinations thrived and escaped
regulation ...
.... The antitrust laws, being a preaching device, naturally
performed only the functions of preaching.
The actual result of the antitrust laws was to promote the
growth of great industrial organizations by deflecting the attack
on them into purely moral and ceremonial channels ....
The reason why these attacks always ended with a ceremony of
atonement, but few practical results, lay in the fact that there
were no new organizations growing up to take over the functions
of those under attack. 50
Of course, Arnold was not really arguing that the sole impact of
the anti-trust laws during the period 1890-1935 was symbolic. For
example, he clearly emphasized in latter writings his belief that the
enforcement policies of the Theodore Roosevelt administration had
effectively precluded the importation of the European cartel system
49. Fair Fights and Foul, supra, note 4 at 129-130.
50. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 207-20.
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into the United States. 51 Furthermore, as Richard Hofstadter had
pointed out,
Even Thurman Arnold . . . had to concede . . . that the same
anti-trust rhetoric, by encouraging the notion that great
corporations could be disciplined and made respectable, had
something to do with the fact that they finally did become
respectable; and that without the presence of hostile laws the
pricing policies of big business might have been a good deal more
unfavorable to the public interest . . . even the overblown
rhetoric of the anti-trust movement finds its place, and even the
Progressive charade of anti-monopoly takes on a function that
goes beyond mere entertainment. No doubt the immediate
material achievement was quite small in proportion to all the
noise; but there are many episodes in history in which intense
struggle has to be waged to win modest gains, and this too must
be remembered before we pass too severe a judgment on the great
Progressive crusade against the trusts.52
Ironically, it was Thurman Arnold himself who - as Head of the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division under Franklin Roosevelt
- finally reversed this general pattern of non-enforcement of the
anti-trust laws. In terms of his thesis, it is clear that the social
51. In Fair Fights and Foul, supra, note 4 at 126, Arnold argues that Theodore
Roosevelt transformed the Sherman Act "from a meaningless and ineffective
formula into a sharp weapon". He bases this assessment on the prosecution brought
in the Northern Securities Case. However, a modern historian suggests that even
this prosecution was a ceremonial observance rather than a genuine effort to
reinstate the philosophy of competition in the railroad industry:
The Northern Securities case was a politically popular act, and it has strongly
colored subsequent historical interpretations of Roosevelt as a trust-buster. It
did not change the railroad situation in the northwest, the ownership of the
railroads in that region, nor did it end co-operation among the Hill-Morgan and
Harriman Lines. Roosevelt never asked for a dissolution of the company, or a
restoration of competition. (G. Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (New
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963 at 67.)
Nevertheless, Arnold is clearly right in his view that it was Teddy Roosevelt who
"enshrined the act as part of our national folklore" and who made it "emotionally
impossible for American business to co-operate in the European Cartel System":
The image of the Sherman Act has not prevented tremendous concentrations of
economic power, but it has prevented such concentrations from obtaining
legitimate status.
Arnold believed that it was Teddy Roosevelt who created this "image". See Fair
Fights and Foul, supra, note 4 at 128.
52. R. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1955) at
255-56.
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function of those laws ceased to be predominantly symbolic and
instead became overtly instrumental.
Arnold had previously undertaken a more general discussion of
symbolic functions of the legal system in his earlier work, The
Symbols of Government. One of the theses of that book was
Arnold's view that the administration of criminal justice served at
least two separate purposes; first, the keeping of order; and second,
the "dramatization of the moral notions of the community." 53 At
the heart of Arnold's discussion of the second purpose is his
treatment of the public trial as the medium through which an
individual case becomes the vehicle for conveying a series of object
lessons to the public at large. Viewed in this light, it is clear that the
public trial - with its elaborate protections for the accused - is not
designed to act as an efficient instrument of crime control; instead,
it is the centre of an elaborate ceremony which dramatizes
fundamental community ideals and (hopefully) resolves the frequent
conflict between them:
Obviously . . .the public administration of criminal justice is
not a method of controlling crime. It is rather one of the problems
which must be faced by those who desire to control crime.
Without the drama of the criminal trial, it is difficult to imagine
on just what institution we would hang our conflicting ideals of
public morality. It is hard to imagine government except in the
light of a protector of decency and morals through a series of
parables which are a guide to the honest and a terror to the
outlaw.
54
It is interesting to note that Arnold's concentration upon the
symbolic functions of law foreshadowed the interest of many
contemporary social scientists in this area. 55 Indeed, perhaps it is
precisely in this area of research that Arnold's deserved success
highlights the shortcomings of many of his colleagues in the
so-called realist movement.
53. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 153.
54. Id. at 147-8.
55. See e.g., H. Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies
(1956), LXI Am. J. of Sociology 420; J. R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status
Politics and the American Temperance Movement (Urbana: U. of Illinois Press,
1963); M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: U. Of Illinois Press,
1964); V. Aubert, Some Social Functions of Legislation (1967), 10 Acta
Sociologica 98; J. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public
Designations of Deviance (1967), 15 Social Problems 175. Note Garfinkel's
elaboration of Arnold's thesis as to the social function of the criminal trial, at 424:
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VIII. The Intellectual Tasks Performed by Arnold's Jurisprudence
1. The Clarification of Goals
I have no doubt as to the practical desirability of a society
where principles and ideals are more important than individuals.
It is an observable fact that such a society is more secure
spiritually and hence more tolerant. Yet the belief that there is
something peculiarly sacred about the logical content of these
principles, that organizations must be molded to them, instead of
the principles being molded to organizational needs, is often the
very thing which prevents these principles from functioning. The
greatest destroyer of ideals is he who believes in them so strongly
that he cannot fit them to practical needs.
5 6
In Arnold's view, a set of ideals accepted as an article of faith is
absolutely essential to the continued health and vitality of society
and its constituent organizations. However, except in a very general
sense, these fundamental ideals offer little guidance to the
practically minded decision-maker; indeed, according to Arnold,
their primary function is psychological being aimed at the
"consolation of the masses". The decision-maker who attempts to
perform his duties on the basis of logical derivation from the
principles constituting an institutional creed or mythology is thus
rendering society a grave disservice. As Arnold pointed out, even
the most humanitarian decision-maker can effectively block social
progress if he substitutes loyalty to abstract goals for a realistic
appraisal of practical needs and practical methods of mobilizing
organizational resources to satisfy such needs.
57
The devices for effecting degradation vary in the feature and effectiveness
according to the organization and operation of the system of action in which
they occur. In our society the arena of degradation whose product, the redefined
person, enjoys the widest transferability between groups has been rationalized,
at least as to the institutional measures for carrying it out. The court and its
officers have something like a fair monopoly over such ceremonies, and there
they have become an occupational routine.
The notion, that crime and its enforcement dramatize community ideals and thus
perform a vital social function, really stems from Emile Durkheim's Rules of
Sociological Method (New York: Free Press, 1966). However, Arnold does not
appear to have been aware of Durkheim's work.
56. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 393.
57. . . . The failure of respectable people with humanitarian values to be effective
in this country may be traced to their complete misunderstanding of the
functions of public controversy. Unaware of the fact that it is not logic but
Jurisprudence Washed with Cynical Acid 497
As was the case with most of the harbingers of Roosevelt's New
Deal, Arnold perceived his role as being that of Hercules cleansing
the Aegean Stables of unhealthy attitudes; in his view, the needs of
American society were painfully obvious, the technology was
available to satisfy them, and all that was necessary was the
cultivation of a practical attitude on the part of the nation's
authoritative decision-makers. For Arnold, as much as for
Roosevelt, there was no need for a positive philosophy; results
furnished their own justification. As Richard Hofstadter points out:
At the core of the New Deal, then, was not a philosophy (F.D.R.
could identify himself philosophically only as a Christian and a
Democrat), but an attitude, suitable for practical politicians,
administrators, and technicians, but uncongenial to the moralism
that the Progressives had for the most part shared with their
opponents.
....... For the people at large - that is for those who needed
it most - the strength of the New Deal was based above all upon
its ability to get results. 58
The precise nature of the "practical" attitude which Arnold
hoped to foster in his quest for responsible decision-making was
dramatically revealed in a striking passage from The Symbols of
Government:
From a humanitarian point of view the best government is that
which we find in an insane asylum. In such a government the
physicians in charge do not separate the ideas of the insane into
any separate sciences such as law, economics, and sociology; nor
then instruct the insane in the intricacies of these three sciences.
Nor do they argue with the insane as to the soundness or
unsoundness of their ideas. Their aim is to make the inmates of
the asylum as comfortable as possible, regardless of their
respective moral deserts. In this they are limited only by the
facilities of the institution . . . . It is . . . possible to adopt a
point of view toward government where ideas are considered
only in the light of their effect on conduct. To a certain extent,
the government which civilized nations impose on savage tribes
organizations which rule an organized society they select logical principles
as objects of their loyalties instead of organizations. (Id. at 384.)
For a valuable chronicle of the shift from the moralism of the Progressive era to the
hard-boiled approach of the New Deal, see G. E. White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Twentieth Century
America (1972), 58 Virginia Law Review 999 at 1024-26. See also Hofstadter,
supra, note 52 at 316-28.
58. Hofstadter, supra, note 52 at 325-26.
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does succeed in taking this attitude; and success in dealing with
such tribes is largely determined by the ability of the governing
group to utilize taboos, instead of trying to stamp them out as
unsound. 59
Unfortunately, it was passages such as this which opened the
door to widespread misunderstanding of Arnold's approach. Critics
of his works charged that he was in effect denying the very validity
of the task of evaluation and they supported the charge by focussing
on the striking distinction which Arnold draws between having and
projecting ideals, on the one hand, and making "practical"
decisions, on the other.6" Furthermore, many critics believed the
effect of Arnold's approach was to place decision-making power in
the hands of ruthless "opportunistic" men who would cynically
manipulate symbols in order to obtain the approval of the masses. 6 1
However, despite the fact that his approach to the task of
evaluation is somewhat obscure, Arnold is surely miscast as a
modem Machiavelli. If Arnold's approach is probed more
59. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 232-33.
60. Arnold's language draws a false and almost vicious dichotomy between
having and projecting ideals (called studying ritual "in the light of faiths and
symbols") and scientific observation. The consequence of this is to make men
foolish and scientific method unenlightened. (E. N. Garlan, Legal Realism
and Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941) at 15-16.)
61. Edward A. Purcell Jr. in his article American Jurisprudence Between the
Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, [1969] American
Historical Review 424 at 437-38 points out that the publication of Arnold's
Symbols of Government and Robinson's Law and the Lawyers occurred at a highly
inopportune time:
The realists had raised, unintentionally, fundamental questions about the
possibility and validity of democratic government at a time when the country
needed reassurance and conviction.
Inside the ominous framework constructed by the existence of the totalitarian
governments, a new extremism in the realist movement itself was working to
invite the bitter attack. In 1935 Robinson and Arnold . . . published studies
that assumed a sweeping ethical realism ...
Arnold . . . argued that abstract theories and moral values were not only
unfounded, but were wholly mythical . . . In his sweeping rejection of the
validity of... ideals Arnold left no basis for distinguishing between morally
good or bad symbols or for establishing the legitimacy of any ethical position
whatever. In his approach ethical values faded through relativism and out of
existence.
Shortly after their two books were published, at a time when men could see the
rampant brutality of Nazism, the vigorous counterattack began its harshest
phase.
Some of the harshest criticism levelled against Arnold and Robinson may be found
in P. Mecham, The Jurisprudence of Despair (1936), 21 Iowa L. Rev. 669.
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thoroughly it will be seen that he completely disapproved of the
"Madison Avenue" manipulator and the hypocritical politician. In
Arnold's jurisprudence, it is a fundamental assumption that
decision-makers should exercise their powers in accordance with
humanitarian goals. He never made the content of these goals
explicit; perhaps, like the New Deal itself, he took it for granted that
there was at least a minimal consensus in American society as to
what constitutes the essence of "humane" behaviour. In any event,
it is quite clear that Arnold did not entirely eschew responsibility for
the postulation of his own recommended values. For example, he
argued that his "insane asylum" model of government was "based
on a humanitarian ideal which seems to be indestructible in the
march of society - the idea that it is a good thing to make people
comfortable if the means exist by which it can be done. "62
The goal of "making people comfortable" was really part of a
philosophy, which Max Lerner has called "Middle class
radicalism" - "something that is neither communism nor
capitalism, but something else in its own way just as thorough going
- that tertium quid, American radicalism. ' 63 What Arnold sought
was an equitable distribution of wealth under a system of free
competition. 64 In his view, "America can only survive under a
62. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 236 (emphasis added).
63. Lerner, supra, note 11 at 701.
Arnold believed that a new governmental creed was symbolized by President
Franklin Roosevelt:
... all the signs point to the fact that a new creed, which can reconcile itself to
the facts of human organization is about to bom. It has as yet no formulas. It is
represented vaguely by the personality of Roosevelt who has become a symbol
for a political attitude which cannot yet be put into words...
• ..he expresses for a majority of the public the current distrust of old myths
and the belief that the government has a new role to play in providing for
security of individuals in their jobs and in the distribution of goods. (Folklore,
supra, note 2 at 390- 1.)
"Middle class radicalism" is perhaps an excellent shorthand reference to the
implicit social philosophy held by most of the legal realists. Garlan has another
term for Arnold's philosophy: "Benevolent Justice". See E. N. Garlan, supra,
note 60 at 108-113.
64. This goal is reflected in the work of the institutional economists; see e.g., the
following description of the approach of John R. Commons:
Commons looked forward to seeing a form of "reasonable capitalism" in which
conflict would be replaced by cooperation and reasonable values and practices
would be established through administrative agencies working together with
private economic groups. (Gruchy, supra, note 15 at 464.)
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competitive philosophy and a strong antitrust enforcement" 65
because competition was a part of the American cultural pattern:
In a society where individual freedom is the prevailing ideal,
the main method of distributing goods and services must be by
free exchange in a free market. It is not a particularly orderly
process. It is not a planned economy. It is the only process which
relies on the independence of the individual as a person rather
than on his efficiency as a cog in a machine . . . It is the
American ideal because the existence of industrial democracy is
the only basis on which political democracy can rest. 66
A further important aspect of Arnold's social philosophy was his
emphasis on the value of tolerance67 and, in particular, his concern
with freedom of speech. In his view, this latter goal was a "spiritual
value" which was not even open to debate 68: furthermore, it was an
ideal to which he sacrificed a fair share of energy and time during
his days in private practice. In the words of his partner, Abe Fortas:
He was an individualist, and he was outraged when big
government or a big corporation used its power to oppress or
circumscribe individuals. I think that, despite his scintillating,
devastating writings on the economic and social implications of
antitrust, Arnold's passion as an antitruster stemmed directly
from this basic, humanistic attitude - a Westerner's dislike of
suppression, a Westerner's commitment to the openness of life.
He was one of the last of freedom's gladiators who fought
freedom's battles on these terms, the old-fashioned American
terms. He was one of the last of the generation which was
whole-heartedly committed to the fight for individual freedom,
without regard to freedom-for-what .... 69
Even though Arnold's basic goals are none too explicit, it is
nevertheless somewhat surprising that his approach was the target of
criticism that was almost irrational in its force. Perhaps the source
of this vigorous opposition lay in a factor identified by Arnold
himself when he suggested that the use of the tools developed by
cultural anthropologists for the observation of "primitive peoples"
could only be expected to arouse discomfiture when they were
turned on the myths of modem man himself:
65. Letter to Matthew Josephson, October 17, 1945; Selections, supra, note I at
105.
66. Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business (New York: Regnal and Hitchcock, 1940).
67. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 269.
68. Letter to Feature Editor of the Saturday Review, December 2, 1954:
Selections, supra, note 1 at 84.
69. Fortas, supra, note 3 at 998.
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An objective study of government is necessarily troubling to
the intellectuals of our time because the prevailing mental
pictures of our folklore compel us to deny the facts before us.
Since those pictures represent current ideas of order and dignity
in human affairs, objective observation of the facts of social
organization appears to those who believe in its current myth to
present government as meaningless, amoral, and uncontrollable
except by methods condemned by our folklore as unscrupulous.
Men cannot face the world without some sort of religion; they
cannot feel comfortable about their government without a set of
ideals which cannot be supplied merely by scientific
observation.
70
Within the context of the early years of the New Deal, Arnold's
lack of concern for the clarification of ultimate goals is readily
understandable; indeed, he was one among many jurisprudes who
espoused the cause of experimentalism during the realist era.
Unfortunately for Arnold, the second world war proved to be a
sobering lesson as to the inadequacy of experimentalism as a
philosophy; the tyranny of an abused technology was a foe that
could not be defeated by ethical relativism. As Arnold himself later
recognized, "it is easy to expose the irrationality of man's conduct
and show the tremendous cost in material advancement of our belief
in old symbols. Yet that cost must be paid because without them, as
we can see in the case of Russia and Germany, men lose themselves
in the greatest illusion of all, the illusion that absolute power may be
benevolently exercised." 
71
2. The Description of Past Trends in Decision
Courts owe their prestige to the fact that they are constantly
making the law more and more certain. They owe their power to
the fact that they never clarify total situations. They leave the
cases which are just around the comer always undecided, and
thus compel businessmen and legislators to be constantly in fear
of their judicial veto.
72
Unlike Karl Llewellyn, Arnold did not undertake any systematic
study of past trends in decision. However, in three early articles he
clearly outlined a framework for carrying out this intellectual task.
In Criminal Attempts - The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction (1930),
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1931), and The Role of
70. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 388-89.
7 1. Letter written in November 1959: Selections, supra, note 1 at 57.
72. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 173.
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Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process (1932),
Arnold followed the lead of other legal realists - such as Cook and
Oliphant - by contending that the plotting of past trends in judicial
decision should be in terms of factual background and future utility
rather than in terms of logic and definition.
In his article on criminal attempts, for example, Arnold
contended that legal scholars had been seriously mistaken in their
prolonged efforts to treat "attempt" as a substantive crime; in his
view, jurists should discuss criminal attempts only in relation to the
particular crime attempted. According to Arnold, the "law of
attempt" simply meant that the courts were exercising an innate
power to "fill in the gaps" which a set of definitions inevitably
leaves when applied to human conduct. 73 In his view, it was absurd
- and indeed dangerous - for legal scholars to treat a power as
though it were a definition of a substantive crime because that
approach would either destroy the power or else "hopelessly
confuse it." Perhaps the key phrase of the article was the following:
May we not restate our generalizations so as to describe more
accurately the results of the past and cause less confusion in the
future?74
In his more celebrated article on the Restatement of the Law of
Trusts Arnold further developed his approach to the task of
describing past trends in decision. The main thrust of the work is a
withering attack on the techniques used by Professor Scott coupled
with a demonstration of alternative methods available for restating
the law of trusts. Arnold argued that the Restatement merely
presented modern ideas and current problems in "the garb of
ancient language" and that it was really designed to present a
"complete philosophical system." By way of contrast, Arnold
presented an alternative method of restatement which he recom-
mended for adoption by legal scholars; the gist of the recommend-
ation was that the language of the law of trusts should be examined
in the light of its utility in solving modern problems - Arnold
described his approach as follows:
To avoid the confusion caused by the fact that all sorts of
problems are included under the term "Trust", we need only
recognize the implications of the admission made in the
73. Criminal Attempts - The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction (1930), 40 Yale L.J.
53 at 75.
74. Id. at 74.
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introduction that "a trust is one of several juridical devices", and
that it has been used in inconsistent ways. It is not the name of an
organized philosophy, it is simply a bad piece of indexing. But
paradoxically enough, the fact that so many people consider it as
an organized philosophy and have written so many books from
that point of view is the very reason why this conventional
department of the law so badly needs the attention of the
American Law Institute. The reclassification of the cases using
this term, already under way, is hindered on every turn by the
existence of this ancient and too inclusive concept. If the
restatement is to clear away the debris and make a new
arrangement possible, it must abandon definitions in favor of a
simple descriptive process of the purposes for which this logical
machine is used in different kinds of cases.
75
In the third article mentioned, Arnold contends that legal scholars
should examine substantive law and procedure in the light of the
functions they perform in the actual operation of the judicial system.
More specifically, he argued that "substantive law" and "proce-
dure" are only classifications which represent an attitude towards
legal rules. "Substantive law", in Arnold's view, performed the
function of maintaining the prestige of the judiciary:
Substantive law, insofar as it is peculiar to courts, is the
justification of the attitude that courts are acting impersonally and
that their government is one of laws and not of men. It is not an
institution which governs society, yet its function requires it
always to appear to be. Without an independent judiciary we
would have no occasion to use it among our ideals. Something
else, such as Divine Right of Kings, or the Five-Year Plan,
would take its place.
Legal writers, scholars, and philosophers furnish the necessary
theological background without which no abstraction which gives
prestige to a human institution is able to survive. 76
According to Arnold, therefore, an attitude of "substantive law"
indicates that judges and legal scholars must discuss legal rules in
terms of abstract principles; on the other hand, an attitude of
"procedure" indicates that legal rules will be discussed only in
terms of their practical utility and applicability to a particular
problem. "Procedure" - unlike "substantive law" - is not
concerned with maintaining judicial prestige and hence it can be
75. The Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1931), 31 Col. L. Rev. 800 at 814.
76. The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process (1932), 45
Harv. L. Rev. 617 at 634.
504 The Dalhousie Law Journal
discussed in practical terms without any fear that inconsistencies
will impair the authority of the judicial system.
It was Arnold's contention that legal scholars should attempt to
discuss the inter-play of "substantive law" and "procedure" from
the point of view of their differing functions within the legal process
as a whole. According to Arnold, American legal scholars of the
1930s were classifying too many past decisions in terms of
"substantive law" - with the inevitable result that a surfeit of
conflicting precedents began to tarnish the prestige of the courts.
77
His own recommendation was that legal scholars should reduce the
excess of precedents by classifying more judicial decisions in terms
of "procedure": it was his belief that this shift in approach would
enable the courts to maintain their prestige while at the same time
permitting them to discuss an increasing number of cases in terms of
practical problems rather than in terms of abstract principles which
are unrelated to reality:
We have a very practical problem before us, to make our way to
judicial expression more intelligible, and our judicial principles
and ideals more effective. The writer thinks that it can only be
solved by determining what problems may be removed from the
rigid philosophy of substantive law and brought down into the
practical atmosphere of procedure. This is not a denial of the
necessity of a rigid philosophy of substantive law in our judicial
system. It is simply an attempt to point out that the legal scholar
or critic, by centering his attention on the judicial institution in
connection with the problems with which it is confronted, can
determine which of these problems should be treated with the
attitude of substantive law, and which with the attitude of
"procedure". 78
Unfortunately, Arnold never developed the basic framework
outlined in these three early articles. As a result, the task of
describing past trends in decision did not become a dominant facet
of his jurisprudence.
3. The Prediction of Future Trends in Decision
.. . while the guess of a technician has a fair chance of being
wrong, the guess of a student of governmental or economic
theory is almost sure to be wrong . . . . a review of expert
guesses made before the depression seems to indicate the truth of
the assertion. . . In larger affairs the diagnoses of the majority of
77. Id. at 636.
78. Id. at 647.
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those trained in legal and economic science were even worse
..... The most careful and scholarly lawyers, leaving out of
consideration the limitations of the Supreme Court as an
organization, proved conclusively that the Wagner Labor Act
would be declared unconstitutional.
79
It should have become evident by this stage that Arnold clearly
rejected the notion that decisions can be predicted on the basis of
legal or economic theory. However, unlike Underhill, Moore and
other scholars, Arnold did not turn his attention to quantitative
analysis as an alternative method for pursuing the task of projecting
future trends in decision.
However, Arnold did argue that a knowledge of "organization
factors" would lay the basis for reasonable accuracy in the task of
prediction. In connection with a discussion of the failure of
economic theorists to make accurate predictions concerning the
Great Depression, Arnold said:
The best predictions came from men who were not using current
fiscal symbols but who were thinking in terms of organization.
Floyd Odlum of the Atlas Corporation rose to a position of
immense financial power by engaging in financial undertakings
at the time when most experts had determined that financing was
unsafe because of the Securities Exchange Act and other
governmental interferences with business. He was successful
because he thought in terms of control of great industrial
armies.8 0
Curiously, Arnold does not suggest any systematic procedures for
predicting future decisions on the basis of such "organizational
factors". Indeed, he appears to have considered the predictive task
to be a very low priority in the Jurisprudence he sought to build.
4. The Scientific Task; The Analysis of Factors Conditioning
Decision
One of the significant hallmarks of the American legal realist
movement was its deep-rooted concern with the psychology of the
judicial decision-making process. Edward S. Robinson - Arnold's
close companion in the 1930s - was a notable example of such
concern. In his view, the scientific task should revolve around a
systematic analysis of the various psychological pressures which -
whether consciously or subconsciously - mold -the judicial
79. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 134-35.
80. Id. at 200-201.
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decision-making process. The factors he earmarked for close study
were extremely diverse - they include biological drives, legal and
ethical values, the interpersonal dynamics of group decision-
making, and the individual decision-maker's subjective perception
of the acceptability of his determinations both to those who review
his decisions and to those who are directly affected by them. 8'
Robinson described an important purpose of such research in the
following manner:
Possibly with the development of a thorough going naturalistic
jurisprudence we shall be able to incorporate into the science of
law a sympathetic and useful understanding of the curious mental
traits of judges, juries, politicians, and laymen to the end that
there may be a basis for legal control comparable to that which
already exists in the more enlightened areas of education and
psychiatry. 
8 2
In complete contrast with the approach suggested by his closest
colleague, however, Thurman Arnold never manifested the slightest
interest in constructing a model of the decision-making process. On
the contrary, his focus upon the judicial decision was but a part of
an intricate analysis of the role played by the judicial system in the
maintenance of the social order. As we have stressed previously,
Arnold's overriding concern was with the psychological function
performed by the legal system and the tenor of his thesis is that the
courts perform a predominantly ceremonial function in the course of
which conflicting ideals are reconciled by the invocation of
"higher" principles and the general population is "comforted" by
the fond illusion that abstract principles of law - and not mere men
- govern society. Since his principal concerns lay elsewhere, an
analysis of the factors affecting decision did not become an integral
part of Arnold's Jurisprudence.
However, despite the fact that he did not commit himself to a
rigorous performance of the scientific task, Arnold nevertheless
discussed certain organizational factors which are clearly crucial to
an understanding of the decision-making process. These factors are
contained in Arnold's "principles of political dynamics" and are
gathered together under the title of "organizational personality":
When men are engaged in any continuous cooperative activity,
they develop organizations which acquire habits, disciplines, and
morale; these give the organizations unity and cause them to
81. Robinson, supra, note 4, c. VIII.
82. Id. at 316.
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develop something which it is convenient to describe as
personality or character ...
The personality which organizations acquire is the result both of
accident and environment. The accidental features depend mostly
on the types of individuals who first assume control. The
environment puts great pressure on those individuals to conform
to what is expected of them in terms both of practical results and
the representation of sentimental ideals. 83
We have seen in some detail that Arnold copiously documented
what may be termed the "negative effect" of folklore and
organizational myth on the decision-making process; that is to say,
he clearly illustrated the manner in which an overly rigid adherence
to ideals may prevent decision-makers from meeting the emergent
needs of a society in the throes of rapid change. Furthermore,
Arnold's principles of political dynamics demonstrate the
emergence of alternative decision-making bodies when the web of
myth paralyzes traditional institutions; the classic example of this
process being the success of the political machine in the 1930s.
Similarly, Arnold showed that the need for "practical" decisions in
a modem society spawns a host of agencies and arbitrational bodies
to which little symbolic value is attached thus freeing the
decision-maker from the necessity of dramatizing community
ideals.
There is no doubt that these basic insights significantly enrich our
understanding of the pervasive influence of symbol and myth in the
decision-making arena but they do so only in a haphazard and
fortuitious manner. Arnold's jurisprudence is conspicuously lacking
in any attempt to develop a systematic treatment of the factors
conditioning decision. As we have seen, Arnold ignores the
individual psychology of the decision-maker and his discussion of
the environmental variables conditioning decision is limited to
broad generalizations about myth and folklore. While the concept of
"organizational personality" suggests many possible avenues of
exploration in the pursuit of knowledge about the factors
conditioning institutional decisions, it is one of the tragedies of
Modem Jurisprudence that Arnold failed to pursue them.
5. The Invention and Evaluation of Policy Alternatives
• .. one who desires to be effective in society must be permitted
to hope and to work for that hope. The wages of pessimism are
83. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 350.
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futility. The writer has faith that a new public attitude toward the
ideals of law and economics is slowly appearing to create an
atmosphere where the fanatical alignments between opposing
political principles may disappear and a competent, practical,
opportunistic governing class may rise to power. Whether such a
hope is well founded or not is impossible to say .... 84
Arnold offered no detailed programme for the guidance of
decision-makers. As we have seen, he was an unabashed
experimentalist whose main goal was the achievement of a more
equitable and more efficient means of distributing wealth within
American society. Presumably, his approach to the task of inventing
and evaluating policy alternatives would approximate that of such
scholars as Cook and Dewey whose efforts were directed at the
improvement of choice on the basis of a more informed
understanding of the resources available to the decision-maker.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that Arnold believed
that the rise of a new class of social technicians during the 1930s
would foster the very attitude necessary for the implementation of
experimental decision-making: in his view, the coming to power of
such a group would create a folklore in which the scientific
approach to the solution of social problems would become an
accepted part of the decision process:
Today we can observe the rise of a class of engineers, salesmen,
minor executives, and social workers - all engaged in actually
running the country's temporal affairs. Current mythology puts
them in the r6le of servants, not rulers. Social workers are given a
subordinate r6le. For purposes of governmental policy their
humanitarian ideas are positively dangerous, because they put
consideration of actual efficiency in the distribution of goods
above reverence for the independence and dignity of the
businessman. It is as if a usurer attempted to sit at the table in
social equality with the mediaeval baron to whom he was lending
money.
Nevertheless, it is this great class of employees, working for
salaries, which distributes the goods of the world. The new class,
however, has already shown signs of developing a creed of its
own and a set of heroes. In our universities it is represented by a
group of younger economists, political scientists, and lawyers. 85
Unfortunately, Arnold did not suggest any procedures for the
systematic consideration of policy alternatives; like the majority of
84. Symbols, supra, note 2 at 270-71.
85. Folklore, supra, note 2 at 38-39.
Jurisprudence Washed with Cynical Acid 509
American Jurisprudes in that optimistic era, he evidently felt that
the inculcation of a scientific attitude was innovation enough for a
legal system suffering from a prolonged overdose of arid
conceptualism. In the years following the second world war,
however, there is evidence that Arnold regretted having stopped his
inquiries at that point and he expressed keen disappointment with
the achievements of the new "social technicians". 86 As Jacques
Ellul has so poignantly stated:
. . . it is apparently our fate to be facing a "golden age" in the
power of sorcerers who are totally blind to the meaning of the
human adventure.
87
86. In the last chapter of Symbols .... I note that the psychiatric point of view is
spreading to the conduct of government and institutions and express the belief
that the attitude toward law and economics "is slowly appearing to create an
atmosphere where the fanatical alignments between opposing political
principles may disappear and a competent, practical, opportunistic governing
class may rise to power." I appear to have been right in my prediction but not
in my hope. (Letter written in November, 1959: Selections, supra, note I at
57.)
87. J. Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964) at 435.
Note Arnold's attitude as manifested in a letter written in December 1956:
Selections, supra, note I at 54-56:
... the new conception of governing people by the manipulations of symbols
and attitudes has not brought pleasant results. It has given us Madison Avenue
instead of Wall Street, it has led to the belief of the Communist that he may
manipulate men's minds with conscious hypocrisy. It has not been a unifying
force and I have now come to the belief that moral principles firmly believed in
as a matter of faith are essential to freedom in any society..
